Did you read that last paragraph. They didn't know where they were as a nation. So how in the hell could Saddam have used something if nobody in their nation knew where they were? Not only that, but read this... |
How about you read this instead.
Resolution 1441 specifically stated:
1) That Iraq was in material breach of the ceasefire terms presented under the terms of Resolution 687. Iraq's breaches related not only to WMDs, but also the known construction of prohibited types of missiles, the purchase and import of prohibited armaments, and the continuing refusal of Iraq to compensate Kuwait for the widespread looting conducted by its troops in 1991.
2) That 1441, and its deadline, represented Iraq's final opportunity to comply with disarmament requirements. In accordance with the previous Resolutions, this meant Iraq not only had to verify the existence or destruction of its remaining unaccounted-for WMD stockpiles, but also had to ensure that all equipment, plans, and materials useful for the resumption of WMD programs was likewise turned over or verified as destroyed.
3) That "...false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq pursuant to this resolution and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq’s obligations".
Iraq agreed to the Resolution on November 13. Weapons inspectors returned on November 27, led by Hans Blix of UNMOVIC and Mohamed ElBaradei of the IAEA. The inspectors had been absent from Iraq since December 1998 when they were withdrawn immediately prior to Operation Desert Fox
Inspectors began visiting sites where WMD production was suspected, but found no evidence of such activities. As was discovered after the invasion of Iraq, no production of WMDs was taking place, and no stockpiles existed. Debate about Resolution 1441 therefore turns on whether, despite the absence of WMDs and the acceptance of inspections, Iraq failed to comply with the terms of the Resolution, and whether an invasion was justified in the absence of any further UN Security resolutions on the subject.
On December 7, 2002, Iraq filed its 12,000-page weapons declaration with the UN in order to meet requirements for this resolution. The five permanent members of the Security Council received unedited versions of the report, while an edited version was made available for other UN Member States. On December 19, Hans Blix reported before the United Nations and stated in regards to Iraq's December 7 report (unedited version): "During the period 1991-1998, Iraq submitted many declarations called full, final and complete. Regrettably, much in these declarations proved inaccurate or incomplete or was unsupported or contradicted by evidence. In such cases, no confidence can arise that proscribed programmes or items have been eliminated." By March, Blix declared that the December 7 report had not brought any new documentary evidence to light.
Iraq continued to fail to account for substantial chemical and biological stockpiles which UNMOVIC inspectors had confirmed as existing as late as 1998. Iraq claimed that it had disposed of its anthrax stockpiles at a specific site, but UNMOVIC found this impossible to confirm since Iraq had not allowed the destruction to be witnessed by inspectors as required by the pertinent Resolutions. Chemical testing done at the site was unable to show that any anthrax had been destroyed there.