About the Great Depression: This was due to the disparity in wealth between rich and poor, I believe my textbook (and if you have trouble with this, take it up with Glencoe) stated 90% of our nation's wealth was in the hands of 10% of the population. This, coupled with several series of loan defaults and bank collapses (unpaid loans were also the reason for the most recent dip in the stock market) lead to severe unemployment as farmers and factory owners couldn't pay what they needed to pay, and I'm sure you know were it goes from there (If not, you're either from another country that wasn't hit too hard by the Great Depression, or you simply can't give a flying *BLEEP* about the U.S).
Current Info on the (U.S) Economy: http://www.commondreams.org/headlines07/0223-09.htm
About Iraq: The War in Iraq is simply a series of incompetent idiots playing around with nostalgic political veterans. The reason for Iraq was...
1. Make up to the Iraqis for letting Sadaam slaughter the Kurds when they rebelled, in which Bush Sr. had his little "Bay of Camels."
2. Wolfowitz especially wanted to rectify this.
3. Making the fat cats fatter. Think, Cheney is the former CEO of Halliburton, and once the reconstruction kicks off he hands out contracts to them and Kellogg, many of which go uncompleted which further fuled Iraqi impatience with American forces. They also gave security contracts to Blackwater U.S.A, a campaign doner. Rather then giving the reconstruction contracts to U.S.A corporations, they could have handed it to the Iraqis.
Many mistakes were made, De-Ba'athification was one of them.
Why? You were taking many of the political veterans of the nation and telling them, "Leave or die." This puts many disenfranchised leaders out on the streets (I believe the unemployment rate in Iraq was at around 25% from about '04-'05). Then the coalition (and I'll get to how "Coalition of the Willing" is a ver far-fetched term) disbanded the Iraqi army (Including the Republican Guard, which was at one point representing Iraq as the 4th strongest army in the world; before Bush sr and then Bush jr completely smashed them). This left thousands of disgruntled SOLDIERS out on the streets, with weapons in hand.
Second, we have our herculean "knock-knock" tactics. The Iraqi matter of honor and respect is no joke. In the U.S, some guy busts in to your house with a Carbine, full combat gear, and a squad of buddies dressed the same way, your going to want to get them to pay for the door. In many cases, in hopes of capturing former high-ranking Ba'athist and terrorist leaders, they would take the men of the house-hold at gunpoint and utterly *bleep*smack him/them in front of his/their wife/family. This rounded up many people who were simply at the wrong place at the wrong time, and trials were slow to start up. The Generals and commanders feared to let go of ANY prisoners, innocent or guilty, in fears of letting out a terrorist or Ba'athist.
Third, our misunderstanding of Iraqi culture and past...involvements...Clinton can recieve some flack for this, especially with the sanctions that killed 5,000 Iraqi children, but it goes as far back as Reagan and the Iran-Iraq war in which you have pictures of Rumsfeld speaking with Sadaam (We put him in power to curve Communist/Socialist influence; if you believe the U.S would never do this, search out Pinochet or most nations in Central America.) Our failure to uphold our bargain with the Kurds and earlier providement of many of his chemical weapons (Which are NOT WMDs) helped foster stigma towards the U.S. As for Iraqi culture, tell me, what can you recall of Iraqi history or their heritage? (Looting of Baghdad museums and in general was a huge problem in the first year of the war.)
Fourth, Chalabi. He was anti-Sadaam *bleep*holes looking out for their own interests. We trained some Iraqi exiles who were in direct connection to Chalabi, I think they were stationed in Basra, were they did little but loot and add to the general tension. He is currently under investigation for some crime-or-another.
Fifth, No general distinction of who was in charge. You have a civillian and military command, Paul Bremer was the civillian guy, Zinni, Frank, ect. were the various military heads and commanders that were switched around. Rarely did these guys work well with each other, and Bremer said he was only answerable to Rumsfeld (and what a character he was) often ignoring Wolfowitz.
There's more, but this, above all, is the most important one...
Sixth, it's the Iraqi's country. They want us out.
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/jan-june07/protests_04-09.html
We failed to prevent Zaraqauwi (remember him? Yah, the dead fat guy) from bombing a key religous sight and spark sectarian violence. In Vietnam, Kennedy said that we would lose the conflict unless we procured the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese. We won the war in Iraq, we smashed Sadaam, but we could not get our gear together and mount a succesful occupation. The U.N confirmed no WMDs, no transference of WMDs, ect. ect. but Zinni was forced to step down when he said we needed more than half-a-million troops to secure borders, cities, and such, while Rumsfeld went with Frank's 150,000. Zinni has since become one of the most vocal critics of the war...
*Sigh...* If you can't understand my ramblings, here's Zinni...
The war planners "misjudged the success of containment" - the existing policy of trade sanctions and maintaining troops in the area.
The "strategy was flawed" - the strategy being that invading, occupying, and setting up a new government in Iraq would help solve the broader conflicts in the Middle East. Zinni said "couldn't believe what I was hearing about the benefits of this strategic move."
The Bush administration "had to create a false rationale for going in to get public support." Zinni said that "the books were cooked, in my mind. The intelligence (that supported the claims made to support the need for war) was not there."
The war planners failed "to internationalize the effort," by gaining the support of allies or unambiguously gaining UN endorsement of an invasion.
The "fifth mistake was that we underestimated the task." Zinni clarified this in his speech to mean the broader task of creating a free, democratic, and functional Iraq.
The sixth mistake was "propping up and trusting the exiles." The exiles Zinni refers to are groups like the Iraqi National Congress and its controversial leader Ahmed Chalabi.
Zinni criticized the "lack of planning" for the post-war stablization and reconstruction of Iraq.
"The eighth problem was the insufficiency of military forces on the ground." Zinni, in his former position, had devised a battle plan for conquering and occupying Iraq in the 1990s, which featured far more troops, as did alternative plans presented to Donald Rumsfeld before the war. The extra troops were needed to "freeze the security situation because we knew the chaos that would result once we uprooted an authoritarian regime like Saddam's."
"The ninth problem has been the ad hoc organization we threw in there." Zinni criticises what he views as the lack of staff, skills, experience, and clear structure in the Coalition Provisional Authority.
According to Zinni, "that ad hoc organization has failed", "leading to the tenth mistake, and that's a series of bad decisions on the ground". These bad decisions include the excessive zeal in "de-Baathification," removing people only peripherally involved in the Baath Party who were Baathists purely to be permitted to conduct their profession or business, the decision to disband the Iraqi army